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This paper examines the effect of asset price volatility on fiscal policy stance. We find 
that asset price volatility affects the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy in a positive 
and significant manner, which according to Fatas and Mihov (2003) has negative 
repercussions on output volatility and economic growth. Higher residential property price 
volatility amplifies both the volatility of government spending and the volatility of the 
discretionary fiscal policy stance. Equity price volatility increases the volatility of the 
fiscal policy stance, primarily via the government revenue channel.  
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  41. Introduction 
The on-going economic and financial market turmoil has been accompanied by a 
significant fall in asset prices, following several years of asset price boom. These asset 
price movements affect the fiscal policy stance through a series of channels (see e.g., 
Schuknecht and Eschenbach, 2004). Directly, they affect specific revenue categories, e.g., 
capital gains and losses related to direct taxes on households and businesses. Indirectly, 
they affect revenue via a feedback loop from higher asset prices to real economic activity 
(higher asset prices raise consumer confidence and consumption, via the wealth effect,) 
which increases the collection of indirect taxes. Finally, in case asset price busts lead to 
defaults of financial institutions, the state will be asked to intervene to preserve the 
stability of the financial system.  
This paper goes beyond the previous literature in examining whether asset price 
volatility amplifies the volatility of fiscal policy outcomes, which according to Fatas and 
Mihov (2003) has negative repercussions on output volatility and economic growth.
1 
Following previous studies, e.g., Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) we use a real aggregate 
asset price index (taken from the Bank of International Settlements-BIS; see Appendix). 
  
2. Asset price volatility and fiscal policy 
Using data for 17 OECD countries for the period 1970 to 2005, we find 
preliminary evidence that asset price volatility has been increasing over time.
2 Driven by 
this evidence, we examine whether this had any significant impact on the volatility of 
fiscal policy stance, as measured by the standard deviation of the change in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP. Next, we repeat the same exercise for the 
volatility of government spending and government revenue, as measured, respectively, by 
                                                 
1 According to Fatas and Mihov (2003) the volatility of output caused by discretionary fiscal policy lowers 
economic growth by more than 0.8 percentage points for every percentage point increase in volatility 
2 While the volatility of economic activity cycles has fallen over the time (either due to better policies or to 
smaller shocks), the volatility of aggregate asset price movements appears to have increased. Splitting the 
sample into four sub-samples we see that the standard deviation of the output gap (real GDP growth) was 
1.946 (0.025) in 1970-1979, 2.389 (0.018) in 1980-1989, 2.635 (0.025) in 1990-1999 and 1.508 (0.015) in 
2000-2005, i.e. the volatility of economic activity has gradually declined over the time. However, in the 
case of the change in the aggregate asset price series, the standard deviation was 0.081 in 1970-79, 0.084 in 
1980-89, 0.088 in 1990-99 and 0.141 in 2000-2005, i.e., it has been increasing.  
  5the standard deviation of the change in the cyclically adjusted total expenditures 
excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP, and the standard deviation of the 
change in the cyclically adjusted total revenues as a percent of GDP. 
Given that our analysis involves only 17 countries, we split the sample into four 
parts, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2005 and construct volatility 
measures and average values for the respective variables and sub-samples. Therefore, our 
unbalanced panel involves at the maximum 68 observations. 
The dependent variable is the log of the standard deviation of the change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP. The key explanatory variables 
are the log of the standard deviation of the change in aggregate asset prices and the log of 
the standard deviation of the real GDP growth. In principle, one could expect (as in Gali 
and Perotti, 2003) that a fiscal policy rule implies that the fiscal stance, i.e. a measure of 
discretionary fiscal policy making (e.g., the change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance as a percent of GDP), would react to output deviations from trend (or 
alternatively GDP growth). Hence, the fiscal policy maker can respond in a counter-
cyclical or pro-cyclical manner to output growth movements; this implies that the 
volatility of real GDP growth should be taken on board when examining the determinants 
of the volatility of the discretionary fiscal policy stance. Note that the sign of coefficient 
can be either positive or negative, depending on whether the fiscal policy maker responds 
in a very pronounced manner or not.  In a similar manner a fiscal policy maker might be 
asked to respond or take on board asset price movements. For example, this can happen 
when a fiscal policy maker has to respond to an asset price bust by increasing government 
spending in order to counterbalance the effects of falling asset prices on economic 
activity and, possibly to address the related vulnerabilities of the financial system (see 
Tagkalakis, 2009). Alternatively, if primary balances and in particular government 
revenues are not adjusted both for the economic and the asset price cycle, then cyclically 
adjusted primary balances (and cyclically adjusted revenues) will be affected by asset 
price movements (see e.g., Jaeger and Schuknecht, 2004 and Morris and Schucknecht, 
2007). Hence, asset price volatility should be taken on board when investigating the 
determinants of the volatility of the fiscal policy stance. Note that the sign of the 
coefficient of the asset price volatility variable can be either positive or negative.    
  6An alternative formulation involves the logs of the standard deviation of the 
disaggregated asset prices series, i.e., the change in real commercial property, real 
residential property and real equity prices. The additional control variables used are the 
average value of the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP and the 
average value of the debt ratio. These variables control for the initial budgetary 
conditions. An alternative specification includes the average value of the cyclically 
adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP and controls 
for the government size and the role that the government might have in stabilizing the 
economy via discretionary fiscal policy (see Gali, 1994; Fatas and Mihov, 2003). 
Following Rodrick (1998) and Fatas and Mihov (2003) we include the ratio of imports 
and exports as a percent to GDP (Trade) to control for the fact that a higher degree of 
openness might induce governments to use more actively fiscal policy in order to 
stabilize their economies. Finally, we include the real short term interest rate (RIRS) to 
control for monetary conditions.  
The government spending and revenue specifications include, respectively, the 
average values of the cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments 
as a percent of GDP and the cyclically adjusted total revenues as a percent of GDP. 
Two specifications are considered each time, one with the contemporaneous value 
of the volatility of real GDP growth and a second where we instrument the 
contemporaneous volatility of real GDP growth with its lagged value and the lagged 
value of the standard deviation of output gap. The second specification controls for the 
fact that some of the variation in the volatility of the cyclically adjusted fiscal policy 
variable might still be due to output volatility and not to discretionary policy.  
The results presented in Table 1 indicate that higher asset price volatility 
translates into higher volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. Since both variables are in 
logs, the coefficients report the elasticity of the volatility of discretionary policy with 
respect to the asset price. A 1 percent increase in aggregate asset price volatility leads to a 
0.16-0.27 percent increase in the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy.3 This finding is 
                                                 
3 According to Fatas and Mihov (2003) the volatility of output caused by discretionary fiscal policy lowers 
economic growth by more than 0.8 percentage points for every percentage point increase in volatility. 
Taking the findings by Fatas and Mihov (2003) at face value, a  1 percent increase in aggregate asset price 
  7reaffirmed in Table 2 in the case of residential property and equity prices, with the effect 
of the volatility of residential property prices being more significant (a 1 percent increase 
in residential property price volatility leads to a 0.15-0.22 percent increase in the 
volatility of discretionary fiscal policy). On the other hand, real commercial prices have a 
negative, but insignificant, coefficient estimate. Moreover, an increase in output volatility 
has no significant effect on the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. 
Turning to the other control variables, we see there is significant evidence that 
openness, and higher interest rates increase the volatility of fiscal policy (Tables 1 and 2). 
Higher primary surpluses or lower deficits lead to less volatile fiscal policy outcomes 
(Tables 1 and 2). The proxy of government size enters with a positive coefficient (but  is 
significant only in Table 2), implying that larger governments use fiscal policy more 
actively for stabilizing purposes and, thus, more volatile discretionary fiscal policy 
outcomes. 
As reported in Tables 3 and 4, there is evidence at the disaggregated level that 
higher volatility in real residential property prices induces more volatile government 
spending outcomes (a 1 percent increase in residential property price volatility leads to 
about 0.22 percent increase in the volatility of government spending), while there is much 
weaker evidence in the case of government revenues.4 Increased equity price volatility 
amplifies the volatility of government revenues; a 1 percent increase in equity price 
volatility leads to about 0.37 increase in the volatility of government revenues. Output 
volatility has a positive effect on the volatility fiscal policy, though the effect is not 
significant. The bigger the government size the more volatile government spending is, 
which implies a more active stabilizing role for fiscal policy. More open economies have 
                                                                                                                                                   
volatility leads to a 0.16-0.27 percent increase in the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy, which then 
increases output volatility and consequently reduces economic growth by  0.13-0.22 percentage points.  
4  This might be a bit odd given that one might expect that residential property prices affect mostly 
government revenues. However, as has been shown by Schuknecht and Eschenbach (2004) and Tagkalakis 
(2009) abrupt asset price movements (busts) linked with financial instability can lead to higher government 
spending. This will be the case when the government has to bear part of the burden of a private sector 
bailout or when it wants to take discretionary action in order to avert a negative feedback loop on economic 
activity which could lead to a full blown recession. Moreover, according to a recent European Commission 
(2009) study which investigates the fiscal costs of financial crisis, the deterioration of fiscal balances in past 
financial crises came primarily through the expenditure side, while revenue ratios were on average less 
affected.  
  8to cope with more volatile government revenues. Finally, there is some evidence that a 
higher debt ratio is linked with less volatile government spending.  
 
3. Conclusions 
Based on the fact that asset prices are particularly volatile, we found that there is 
significant evidence that asset price volatility affects the volatility of discretionary fiscal 
policy in a positive and significant manner. Higher residential property price volatility 
leads to more volatile government spending and, thus, to more volatile discretionary 
fiscal policy stance. Equity price volatility affects the volatility of the fiscal policy stance 
primarily via the government revenue channel. On the other hand, output volatility has no 
particular effect on the volatility of fiscal policy stance. Openness and the size of 
government affect positively and significantly the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy; 
the first, primarily, through the revenue channel and the second through government 
spending.  
Hence, fiscal policy makers should take into account asset price movements 
because they amplify the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy stance. This would imply 
that if primary balances and in particular government revenues are not adjusted for both 
the economic and the asset price cycle, then cyclically adjusted primary balances (and 
cyclically adjusted revenues) will be affected by asset price movements (see e.g., Jaeger 
and Schuknecht, 2004 and Morris and Schucknecht, 2007). As a consequence the fiscal 
policy maker will not have a clear grasp of developments in the fiscal policy stance.  This 
points to the need for adjusting fiscal balances, and in particular government revenues, 
for asset price changes. 
Given that asset price movements amplify the volatility of the discretionary fiscal 
policy stance, which in turn amplifies business cycle fluctuations and harms economic 
growth (Fatas and Mihov, 2003), a word of caution is needed as regards the fiscal policy 
interventions undertaken (and their likely continuation) in response to the on-going   
economic and financial market turmoil. 
  9Fiscal policy makers should bear in mind, when asked to respond to abrupt asset 
price movements (e.g., an asset price bust) and to address the likely implications for the 
stability of the financial system (see Schuknecht and Eschenbach, 2004;  Tagkalakis, 
2009), that, while their intervention will most likely have a positive first order effect (in 
terms of safeguarding or restoring economic and financial stability), it will also entail the 
risk of increasing fiscal policy and, consequently, output volatility generating a negative 
effect on economic growth, thus, putting a toll on economic recovery. This negative 
effect should be perceived as an additional argument in favour of promptly withdrawing 
the fiscal measures taken as a response to the economic and financial crisis when the 
recovery gathers pace. 
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  11Appendix 
 
Data  
We used a yearly unbalanced panel data set (1970-2005) of 17 OECD economies: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 




The macroeconomic variables used extend from 1970 to 2005.  Fiscal and output 
variables are from the OECD Economic Outlook (2007), the definitions used are: the 
lagged value of the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP (CAPBY), 
the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP (DCAPBY),  
the lagged value of the debt to GDP ratio (Debt), the lagged value of the output gap 
(Output gap), the lagged value of the short term real interest rate (RIRS), the change in 
the primary balance as a share of GDP (Change in primary balance), the change in   
cyclically adjusted total expenditure excluding interest payments as a share of GDP 
(DCATDXY), cyclically adjusted total expenditure excluding interest payments as a 
share of GDP (CATDXY), the change in cyclically adjusted total revenues as a share of 
GDP (DCATRY), cyclically adjusted total revenues as a share of GDP (CATRY). We 
also used the real GDP growth rate and an openness index (TRADE) which was 
constructed as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP.  
 
Asset price variables 
The main indicator is the change in the log of the annual aggregate real asset 
prices (DRAAP), which covers 1970-2005 for 17 industrial countries and combines price 
indices for three asset classes - equities, residential property and commercial property – 
by weighting the components using shares of the asset classes in private sector wealth. 
The private consumption deflator is used to convert nominal to real asset prices. In 
addition, we considered also the change in the log of the three disaggregate asset price 
indices, i.e., real commercial prices (DRCP), real residential prices (DRRP) and real 
equity prices (DREP).  
  12Table 1: Aggregate asset price volatility and the fiscal policy stance 
Variables  OLS IV  OLS 
 
IV  
Volatility of real GDP growth rate   -0.1068 
(-0.88)    
0.2995 
(0.36)    
-0.0270 
(-0.22)     
-0.2437 
(-0.41)    
Volatility of asset prices  0.2736*** 
(2.82)    
0.2589* 
(1.67)    
0.1693** 
(2.13)    
0.2091 
(1.48)    
CAPBY -0.0736*** 
(-3.12)    
-0.0553** 
(-2.27)    
  
CATDXY     0.0155 
(1.65)   
0.0148 
(1.10)    
Debt -0.0009 
(-0.61)    
-0.0016 
(-0.81)    
-0.0009 
(-0.48)    
-0.0015 
(-0.78)    
Trade   0.0034** 
(2.18)    
0.0030* 
(1.73)    
0.0011 
(0.47)    
0.0015 
(0.63)    
RIRS 0.0587** 
(2.47)    
0.0076 
(0.08)    
0.0408 
(1.45)    
0.0590 
(0.75)    
R2   0.385  0.256  0.283  0.2415 
No of obs.  54  47  54  47 
Notes: Dependent variables: Volatility of the log of the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balances as a percent of GDP.  All 
regressions include an intercept. The p-values in parenthes3s are based on heteroskdastic robust standard errors.. *,**, *** significant 
at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Table 2: Asset price volatility and the fiscal policy stance 
Variables  OLS IV  OLS 
 
IV  
Volatility of real GDP growth rate   -0.1070 
(-0.92)     
0.1696 
(0.31)    
0.0112 
(0.10)   
0.1424 
(0.32)    
Volatility of commercial prices  -0.0469 
(-0.62)    
-0.0337 
(-0.36)    
-0.0985 
(-1.38)    
-0.0653 
(-0.76)    
Volatility of residential prices  0.1064 
(1.08)    
0.2214* 
(1.83)     
0.0935 
(0.91)    
0.1527* 
(1.73)     
Volatility of equity prices  0.2076 
(1.34)    
0.2019 
(1.40)    
0.0136 
(0.09)    
0.0367 
(0.21)    
CAPBY -0.0650*** 
(-2.66)    
-0.0514** 
(-2.18)    
  
CATDXY     0.0222** 
(2.08)   
0.0217** 
(2.02)    
Debt -0.0009 
(-0.51)    
-0.0011 
(-0.68)    
-0.0008 
(-0.44)    
-0.0014 
(-0.79)    
Trade   0.0043** 
(2.38)    
0.0029 






(2.51)    
-0.0074 
(-0.10)    
0.0440 
(1.48)    
-0.0066 
(-0.10)    
R2   0.351  0.293  0.324  0.313 
No of obs.  52  47  52  47 
Notes: As in Table 1.  
 
  13Table 3: Aggregate asset price volatility and government spending and revenue 
Government spending  Government revenues  Variables 
OLS IV  OLS  IV 
Volatility of real GDP growth rate   0.2657 







Volatility of asset prices  0.1065 










(1.76)    
  





(-2.69)     
-0.0034 




(-0.47)   
Trade   0.0018 
(1.66)   
0.0020 
(1.22)    
0.0041*** 
(2.72)    
0.0035* 






(0.68)    
-0.0384 
(-0.28)   
R2   0.385  0.369  0.200  0.118 
No of obs.  56  47  56  47 
Notes: Dependent variables: In columns 1 and 2 is the volatility of the log of the change of the cyclically adjusted  total expenditures 
excluding interest payments as a percent of  GDP, in columns 3 and 4 the volatility of the log of the change of the cyclically adjusted  
total revenues as a percent of  GDP .  All regressions include an intercept. The p-values in parenthes3s are based on heteroskdastic 





Table 4: Asset price volatility and government spending and revenue 
Government spending  Government revenues  Variables 
OLS IV  OLS  IV 
Volatility of real GDP 
growth rate  
0.2398 
(1.25)    
0.4437 
(0.64)     
0.0790 






(-0.57)     
-0.0935 
(-0.92)    
0.0287 
(0.36)    
0.0279 
(0.26) 
Volatility of residential 
prices 
0.2182* 
(1.79)     
0.2581 
(1.34)    
0.1771 
(1.50)    
0.1030 
(0.73) 
Volatility of equity 
prices 
0.0855 








(2.91)    
0.0253** 
(2.10)    
  
CATRY     -0.0012 




(-1.53)    
-0.0024 




(-0.31)    
Trade   0.0018 














(0.25)    
R2   0.451  0.417  0.253  0.436 
No of obs.  54  47  54  47 
Notes: As in Table 3.  
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